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Abstract
Background: The government of Ghana introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 through
an Act of Parliament (Act 650) as a strategy to improve financial access to quality basic health care services.
Although attendance at health facilities has increased since the introduction of the NHIS, there have been
media reports of widespread abuse of the NHIS by scheme operators, service providers and insured persons.
The aim of the study was to document behaviors and practices of service providers and clients of the NHIS
in the Kassena-Nankana District (KND) of Ghana that constitute moral hazards (abuse of the scheme) and
identify strategies to minimize such behaviors.
Methods: Qualitative methods through 14 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) and 5 individual in-depth interviews
were conducted between December 2009 and January 2010. Thematic analysis was performed with the aid of QSR
NVivo 8 software.
Results: Analysis of FGDs and in-depth interviews showed that community members, health providers and NHIS
officers are aware of various behaviors and practices that constitute abuse of the scheme. Behaviors such as frequent
and ‘frivolous’ visits to health facilities, impersonation, feigning sickness to collect drugs for non-insured persons, over
charging for services provided to clients, charging clients for services not provided and over prescription were
identified. Suggestions on how to minimize abuse of the NHIS offered by respondents included: reduction of
premiums and registration fees, premium payments by installment, improvement in the picture quality of the
membership cards, critical examination and verification of membership cards at health facilities, some ceiling
on the number of times one can seek health care within a specified time period, and general education to
change behaviors that abuse the scheme.
Conclusion: Attention should be focused on addressing the identified moral hazard behaviors and pursue
cost containment strategies to ensure the smooth operation of the scheme and enhance its sustainability.
Keywords: Health insurance, Moral hazard, Kassena-Nankana District, Ghana
Background
Ghana has gone through a checkered health care finan-
cing history. Before independence in 1957, there were
user fees at the point of health care access. After inde-
pendence, health care became free and financed by gen-
eral taxes and donor support [1]. However in the
1980s, there were economic crisis and sustainability of
the free health care became questionable [2]. In the
light of this, the government reintroduced user fees
popularly known as “Cash and Carry” in 1992. The
introduction of the user fees decreased the utilization
of health care services at the public health facilities,
and in 2002 alone about 80 % of Ghanaians needing
health care could no longer afford it [1, 2]. The abolish-
ment of the “Cash and Carry” became a topical issue
and it became one of the key issues in the manifesto
and campaigns of the main opposition party, the New
Patriotic Party (NPP). Consequently, in fulfilment of
the campaign promise, the NPP government upon
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winning the elections, established the National Health
Insurance Scheme (NHIS) under Act 650 in 2003 [3].
Although pilot mutual health insurance schemes
have been in existence in many parts of sub-Saharan
Africa since the 1990s, Ghana remains one of the few
African countries to establish a nationwide health in-
surance scheme. The scheme is being described in
Ghana as the “passport to health care”. Essentially,
the scheme is intended to replace out-of-pocket pay-
ments for health services through prepayment of in-
surance premiums. The health insurance scheme is
seen as one of the pillars of the poverty reduction
programme in Ghana. The NHIS is generally financed
by a 2.5 % National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL)
on selected goods and services, a 2.5 % Social Secur-
ity and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) deductions
from the formal workers, premiums from the informal
workers and non-SSNIT contributors, and government
budget allocations. The informal sector workers would
pay an annual minimum premium between Gh¢7.2
and Gh¢48 (approximately US$4.8 to US$32, using an
interbank exchange rate of US$1 =GH¢1.5 as at November
2010) per person. Children below 18 years with at least
one parent paying membership fees or covered by the ex-
emption, pensioners who are formal sector contributors to
SSNIT, the aged (70 years and above) in the informal sec-
tor and indigents are exempted from paying the premium.
In addition, in 2008, the government of Ghana introduced
a free maternal care policy that exempted all pregnant
women from paying premium [4, 5].
Implementation of the national health insurance
scheme required the establishment of mutual health in-
surance schemes at the district level. The NHIS has a
minimum benefit package which every district mutual
health insurance scheme (DMHIS) should cover. This
package covers about 95 % of disease conditions preva-
lent in Ghana [5–8], including malaria, diarrhea, upper
respiratory tract infections, skin diseases, hypertension,
diabetes, and asthma. The package also includes ser-
vices such as outpatient services, inpatient care and
hospital accommodation, dental care, maternity care
(including normal and caesarean deliveries), eye care,
and emergency care. Some services considered very
expensive such as cancer treatment (except breast and
cervical cancer), organ transplant, dialysis , drugs not
listed in the NHIS drugs list , assisted reproduction,
private inpatient accommodation; non-vital services
such as cosmetic surgery are not included in the benefit
package [5–8]. HIV/AIDS symptomatic treatment for
opportunistic infections has been added to the NHIS
benefit package in 2012. There have been calls from
various organizations to the government to let the
NHIS cover the cost of antiretroviral drugs as many
HIV/AIDS patients are faced with the risk of worsening
conditions as they cannot afford the cost of the drugs.
Nevertheless, HIV antiretroviral drugs are heavily subsi-
dized by the National AIDS programme [6].
Studies have shown that health insurance schemes do
improve access to health care and reduce out of pocket
payments for services for insured individuals [5, 8–10].
Although less than half of the population of Ghana is
currently enrolled in the NHIS [11], available records
suggest that facility attendance has increased since the
introduction of the scheme [12]. Despite the increase in
access to health care due to the NHIS [13–17], there are
reports of inequities in enrollment, with low enrollment
among the poor [7, 18, 19].
Studies have examined various aspects of the NHIS in
Ghana such as factors affecting enrollment [20–22],
access to and quality of care [20], influence of NHIS on
behavior of health care providers [16], and utilization of
services [6]. Although these studies have broadened our
understanding of the operation and impact of health in-
surance, various issues remain unclear. Among other
things, the behaviors of insured persons and service pro-
viders which threaten the effective functioning of the
scheme and the public’s awareness of these behaviors
have not been adequately documented. In view of recent
concerns by the National Health Insurance Authority
(NHIA) that the soaring costs of health care for the
insured is due in part to moral hazards from clients and
service providers, it is important to examine the behav-
iors and practices of service providers and consumers
(clients) that constitute moral hazards with a view to
identifying ways to minimize such behaviors and en-
hance the sustainability of the Scheme.
Generally, client moral hazard behavior (demand side
moral hazard) amounts to ‘taking advantage of ’ insurance
mainly because the individual does not have to make
payment at the time of seeking health care services. On
the other hand, provider moral hazard (supply side moral
hazard or supplier induced demand) is over supply at the
initiative of the health provider who takes advantage of
the near absence of any financial considerations on the
part of the patient if he/she agrees to buy the excess health
care because cost will be transferred to the health insur-
ance provider [23].
This study explored behaviors and practices of service
providers and consumers of the national health insurance
scheme in the Kassena-Nankana District (KND) that con-




This study was conducted in the Kassena-Nankana
District of the Upper East region of Ghana. The district
has a population of about 150,000 people in dispersed
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rural communities. There are two main ethnic groups –
the Kassenas and Nankanas, with other ethnic groups
forming about 5 % of the population. The predominant
occupation is subsistence agriculture. As in many parts
of the savanna zone of Ghana (where the district is lo-
cated), poverty is endemic with poverty incidence of
88 % [24–26].
The Kassena-Nankana District is home to the Navrongo
Health Research Centre, which operates the Navrongo
Health and Demographic Surveillance System (NHDSS).
As part of the NHDSS activities, households are rou-
tinely visited to monitor information about pregnan-
cies, births, morbidity, mortality, migration, marriages,
vaccination coverage and other vital socio-demographic
variables [27].
Though the Kassenan-Nankana district has been di-
vided into the Kassena-Nankana East and West dis-
tricts since 2008, both districts were covered by one
mutual health insurance scheme at the time of the
study. For this reason we use the original name of
the district – Kassena-Nankana District – to cover both
districts.
The district has a hospital located in Navrongo that
serves as a referral point for the Kassena-Nankana
district, the Builsa district and neighboring towns in
Burkina Faso. There are seven health centers, and
two community clinics jointly run by the Catholic
Diocesan Development Office and the District Health
Administration that provide services to the communi-
ties. There is one private clinic and 27 functional
Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS)
compounds with resident Community Health Officers
(CHOs) offering doorstep services [28].
The researchers are based in the Navrongo Health
Research Centre (NHRC) located in the Kassena-
Nankana District (KND). The district is a field site of
the NHRC and our research intended to contribute
towards strengthening NHIS in the KND. Given the
limited resources for the research it was convenient
to work within our own environment . This was an
exploratory study and more manageable to do it in a
familiar environment.
Study design and data collection
This study was primarily qualitative, using in-depth in-
terviews (IDIs) and focused group discussions (FGDs) to
elicit information from community members, health care
providers and managers of the Kassena-Nankana district
mutual health insurance scheme. Interview guides (FGD
and IDI) are presented as Additional file 1.
Eight individuals with Bachelor degrees (who are con-
versant in the local languages) were recruited and trained
to collect data for this study. Actual data collection oc-
curred between December 2009 and January 2010.
To explore community knowledge, perceptions and
attitudes towards health insurance and behaviors that
border on moral hazards, 14 focus group discussions
(FGDs) were conducted with various categories of
people in the district. Interviews were conducted
among subgroups defined by gender, age and ethni-
city. Participants in the FGDs were drawn from the
catchment population of the main health facilities of
the district.
The NHDSShas divided the Kassena-Nankana district
into five zones - the East, West, North, South and Central
zones. The East and South zones are predominantly
Nankana speaking while the West and North are Kassem
speaking (with the Central zone having a mixture of ethnic
groups). The zones are further divided into clusters. We
randomly selected three clusters in each zone as the loca-
tion for the FGDs. Individuals who met the age (less than
30 years, 30–45 years, greater than 45 years), gender and
ethnicity (Kassem and Nankana) criteria were then targeted
for participation in the group discussion. Using the NHDSS
database, a list of twenty eligible individuals in each cat-
egory was generated and the first twelve eligible individuals
who consented were invited to participate in each FGD.
In addition to FGDs, we conducted 5 individual in-
depth interviews (IDI) with at least one medical as-
sistant at the main health facilities to further explore
issues of client behaviors from the providers’ point of
view. Thus, medical assistants of the district hospital
(the War Memorial Hospital), the Paga Health Centre,
the Kassena-Nankana East Health Centre and the St. Jude
Clinic were interviewed. These facilities represent the
major public and private health facilities in the district.
Two in-depth interviews with KND health insurance
scheme officers were also conducted to obtain further
information on the insurance scheme and the behavior
of clients and service providers.
Data processing and analysis
The FGDs and IDIs were tape recorded, transcribed ver-
batim and typed. Guided by the objectives of the study
and the themes of the discussion, a coding list was pre-
pared to guide the data analysis. Thematic analysis was
performed with the aid of QSR NVivo 8 software.
Ethics and consent statement
The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the
NHRC Institutional Review Board (NHRCIRB088) prior
to study implementation. Informed consent to take part
in the study was received from the participants.
Results
Moral hazard behaviors by insured members
A primary interest in this study is to identify behaviors
exhibited by insurance scheme members that constitute
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moral hazards. Consequently FGD and IDI participants
were asked about various behaviors that insured persons
engage in that could compromise the efficient operation
of the scheme. Various behaviors that amount to taking
advantage of the NHIS (moral hazard behaviors) were
disclosed by participants.
Frequent visit to health facilities by the insured was
one such behavior identified. Respondents held the opin-
ion that insured persons visit the health facilities more
frequently compared to the non-insured. They also visit
the health facility with the slightest ailment and even
visit different facilities within the same period with the
same ailment to collect more drugs.
They feel cheated if they don’t go; once they are
card bearing members any small cut on their toes,
they are there (at the health facility to seek treatment).
(FGD, Male).
Some of them when you give them the drugs within a
day or two they are coming again without waiting for
the drugs to work. Even we have detected that some
immediately after they have collected the drugs will go
to another facility with the same complaint and collect
drugs again (Medical Assistant, Male).
However, some FGD participants felt that insured
persons were justified in going to health facility with
the least ailment. According to them one runs the
risk of incurring the anger of nurses when you wait
for the situation to become serious before you go for
medical care, as explained by this FGD participant:
If you are insured and you happen to fall sick and you
don’t go immediately for treatment and you wait till
your situation worsens and you then go, the nurses will
insult you and ask you why you are insured and you
did not want to come early? (FGD, Female).
Focus group participants also identified the practice
of insured persons collecting drugs to keep at home.
Insured people know that their membership will ex-
pire at the end of one year. So when the card is due
to expire some who are not sick visit the health facil-
ities to collect drugs to store at home. Some people
feel cheated that they have paid to register and have
not utilized the services. To avoid being cheated they
go to the health facilities even if they are not sick so
that they can use the services.
Others too feel cheated by the scheme since they
have not fallen sick since their registration, so
they feel they should just go and collect the drugs
(FGD, Female).
Every year in October cards will expire and so the
hospitals are normally very full or the attendance is
high because there are some people who will like to use
their cards before they expire (NHIS official, Male).
Another moral hazard behavior identified has to do
with the insured persons using their cards to collect
drugs for the uninsured. Respondents said that some
people go to the health facility and describe the symp-
toms of their sick relations or friends who do not have
the NHIS cards in order to get drugs to give to them.
In addition, the discussion participants revealed that
sometimes the insured give out their cards to their sick re-
lations or friends to go to a health facility to receive treat-
ment. Some FGD participants however blamed the NHIS
authorities for making it possible for such behaviors to
occur. They stated that the pictures on the cards are
sometimes blurred thus making it easy to impersonate.
People who are insured sometimes give their cards to
those who are not insured to go to the hospital for
care. I however think that we need to blame the
authorities for the success of this act because the
pictures on some of the cards are so blurred that it is
easy to deceive others that it is your card when it is
not yours. (FGD, Male).
Prescribers also mentioned the issue of the insured
persons asking for particular drugs (most often expen-
sive ones) to be prescribed for them. In response to the
question whether health insurance members ask for par-
ticular drugs to be prescribed for them, one medical as-
sistant had this to say:
Yes, that one is big yes! Somebody will just come and
ask you to write a certain drug for him/her. Sometimes
when we tell them that we do not have that drug, they
say we should just write it for them to go and collect
at the pharmacy. I am always against that and
because of that I do not have a friend here. (Medical
Assistant, Female).
Moral hazard behaviors are not limited to only the
NHIS clients. There are various practices and behaviors
by service providers that constitute moral hazards. We ex-
plored issues relating to reimbursement of service pro-
viders through interviews with NHIS officials to identify
moral hazard behaviors. Some of the behaviors identified
include over charging for drugs and services provided to
clients, charging for services not provided, as well as in-
flating the number of clients provided with services.
For now the payment to the health facilities is such
that the more clients go to the facility the more we
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pay. Every client is by law supposed to visit the health
facility three times within two weeks; that is first visit
and the other two visits are for you to go for review. So
within the two weeks, some clients can make one visit
but once providers know that more visits attract more
money they can take the folder and write the rest of
the visits and charge accordingly. Some of these
things may be funny but we get cases like that.
(NHIS official, Male).
Furthermore, the tendency of health providers to as-
sign particular diagnosis to clients was mentioned. Spe-
cifically, it was pointed out that health providers tend
to report simple malaria cases treated as severe malaria.
The cost for treating severe malaria (GH¢89.00 or
US$59) is higher than for simple malaria (GH¢28.00 or
US$19); so some providers treat for simple malaria and
charge the NHIS for severe malaria, or diagnose simple
malaria as severe malaria.
There was a time when every malaria that was reported
was captured as severe malaria at the health facilities.
But the issue is that we all know severe malaria and
you cannot treat it at the OPD level and say it is severe
malaria. The person comes and you give him/her
treatment and he/she goes away and you say that
is severe malaria, no. The person comes and you
just detain the person for some few hours and you
say that is severe malaria. So we had to talk to
them and thank God at least it is better now
(NHIS official, Male).
Interviews with the scheme officials revealed that some
NHIS officials condone with health providers to exploit
the scheme. Over prescribing was also mentioned in the
interviews as an issue that has the potential to affect the
sustainability of the scheme.
There were instances where one client could be given
ten different types of drugs for one illness. We used to
tell them (the prescribers) that it was not good and we
at times tried to tell them that they are not supposed
to do that. That is poly-pharmacy (giving so many
drugs to a client). Even going by the Ghana Heath Ser-
vice standard guidelines it says that you should not
give more than five drugs for a particular illness.
(NHIS official, Male).
Community perceptions on the effects of moral hazard
behaviors
From the focused group discussions it was clear that com-
munity members are aware of the negative consequences
of these moral hazard behaviors. Discussants indicated
that such behaviors make health workers unwilling to
treat insured people or give them good drugs when they
go to the clinic because they think that they are just taking
advantage of the NHIS.
Such behaviors have also discouraged really sick
people with NHIS cards from going to the health facility,
as they have to join unnecessarily long queues (due to
large numbers of people attending the facility). Respon-
dents indicated that such behaviors could lead to the
collapse of the scheme as there will be less contribution
and more utilization.
Such behavior can cause the scheme huge debt and a
time will come government will not be able to finance
card bearing members and they can die out of that.
(FGD, Male)
In fact, because many people go, they (health providers)
don’t give them better drugs because they (health
providers) also know it is because of the insurance
people are just trooping in any how. (FGD, Female).
Suggestions to minimize moral hazard behaviors
FGD and IDI participants gave some suggestions that
they felt if implemented would go a long way to dis-
courage people from indulging in such morally haz-
ardous practices. Some respondents were of the view
that if the registration and renewal fees are reduced,
people would find it easy to register themselves and
their relations; this would reduce the need to give
one’s card to an uninsured relative or to collect drugs
for an uninsured relative.
The government should reduce the registration fee. It is
one of the causes why people don’t insure. If the amount
is low everybody can be insured and the abuse of the
scheme will be minimized drastically. (FGD, Female).
Some respondents in the FGD and IDIs were of the
view that provision should be made for people to pay
their premium in installments.
If you can get agents to always go round the community
so that when the card is about expiring, we can be
paying bit by bit so that by the time it is due for renewal
we would have finished paying. (FGD, Female).
FGD respondents were also of the opinion that the
problem of impersonation could be minimized if
health workers take their time to look at pictures on
the cards well before attending to the patient. Also,
those in charge of taking the photos should improve
on their quality of work to make the pictures on the
cards much clearer.
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I think the problem is always from the doctors because
if they look critically, they will know the picture
difference as well as the age. So government should
have monitors who can from time to go round and
monitor the behavior of such doctors and punish
them.” (FGD, Male).
The prescribers (medical assistants) interviewed sug-
gested that the unnecessary visits by members could
be reduced if the scheme could give a ceiling on the
number of times a member could visit a health facil-
ity per month or per year.
I would suggest that they should come up with a
ceiling with regards to the number of times people
could visit the health facility in a year. I think when
they do this people will reduce the way they come to
the health facility for treatment. For instance, if they
say people under the health insurance scheme are
supposed to visit the health facility two or three
times in a year and beyond that you are supposed
to pay, I think that will go a long way to address
the issue of people coming for treatment very often.
(Medical Assistant, Male).
The NHIS officials emphasized education as a key tool
that can change such morally hazardous behaviors from
card members and health providers.
“… on the part of the clients, I think the best way to
address this situation is education. …. I think we
cannot force them because some of the things that they
do (like going to the hospital three times) because it is
their right to go, you cannot force them. You can only
educate them or convince them that the facility is for
them and so they should not abuse it because when it
collapses they are the ones who will suffer. On the part
of the providers, I think education will help and again
if there are prescribed punishment for providers who
engage in such activities and offenders are punished, it
will serve as deterrent to others” (NHIS official, Male).
NHIS officials were of the view that when they have
some training on the relevant drugs for treatment of
some ailments it will help address the issue of over pre-
scribing or wrong billing.
Yes, I think that we the claims managers do not have
the technical expertise and so sometimes you may not
be able to tell whether the drugs given for a particular
diagnosis are the right drugs or drugs that they should
give for such diagnosis. The issue is that you know the
symptoms for typhoid fever may be the same as that of
simple malaria and since simple malaria is only GH¢
28.00 (US$18.67) and that of typhoid fever is GH¢
109.00 (US$72.67),when you identify a drug that is not
supposed to treat typhoid fever and you draw their
attention, you have a problem with them because they
tell you what do you know and where have you done
medicine. So these are some of the problems and so we
really need to be given some training on some of these
things (NHIS official, Male).
Discussion
The introduction of health insurance scheme is a major
step in Ghana’s efforts to make health care accessible to
the people of Ghana. By removing user fees payment at
the time of seeking care, the financial barrier to health
care access is removed thus making it much easier for
people to seek care. Indeed, the increased attendance at
health facilities since the introduction of the scheme
strongly suggests that access to health care has been en-
hanced. However, the operation of the national health
insurance scheme has faced various challenges which
border on the behavior of insured persons, service pro-
viders and scheme officials. These abusive behaviors
contribute to high health care expenditures that threaten
the sustainability of the scheme.
The views expressed by community members in the fo-
cused group discussions highlight the significant impact of
the national health insurance scheme in enhancing access
to health care, especially for the poor. Nevertheless, some
people are unable to pay the premiums and register with
the scheme. The inability of some people to pay the pre-
mium or registration fees has been identified by other
studies as a major barrier in enrolment into a health insur-
ance scheme [5, 14, 15, 29–31]. Currently in the KND, all
adult informal workers’ pay a premium of GH¢8.00 or
US$5.3 in cash plus a registration fee or administrative
charge of GH¢3/US$2 to join the scheme. Those who are
exempted from paying the premium such as the SSNIT
contributors and the aged (above 70 years) only pay the
registration fee (GH¢3/US$2) to become a member.
Though enrolments into the scheme over the past years
have been increasing in the district, as at the beginning of
2012, only 50 % of the population in the district had valid
membership cards [32]. Majority of those unregistered are
the poor and vulnerable who are least able to pay for
health care when they need it. It is therefore important to
strengthen the exemption policy for the poor and vulner-
able to enable them benefit from the scheme so as to
achieve the equity goal of the NHIS and also accelerate
universal health coverage.
Community members, health providers and NHIS
officers are aware of various behaviors and practices
that constitute abuse of the scheme (moral hazard).
In the FGDs and in-depth interviews, behaviors such
as frequent and ‘frivolous’ visits to health facilities,
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impersonation, collecting drugs for non-insured per-
sons, over charging for services provided to clients,
charging clients for services not provided and over
prescription were identified. As expected, hardly any
respondent admitted to personally engaging in these
practices. Nevertheless, participants acknowledged that
these practices exist and some even provided instances of
people engaging in these practices. Other studies have
reported moral hazard behaviors by clients such as the in-
sured offering their cards to the uninsured to use to access
care [16].
Various suggestions on how to minimize abuse of the
NHIS were offered by community members, health
providers and NHIS officials. Community members
were of the opinion that a reduction of premiums and
registration fees would make it possible for everyone to
register and thus avoid the need to use someone’s card
or collecting drugs for uninsured relations and friends.
To further make it easy for people to pay their pre-
miums some suggested that arrangements should be
made for people to pay by installments. Regarding the
problem of impersonation participants suggested an
improvement in the picture quality of the membership
cards as well as a critical examination of membership
cards at health facilities to ensure that the photograph
on the card is really that of the person attending the
facility.
Currently, there is no limit to the number of times an
insured person can visit an accredited health facility for
care. Hence, to discourage people from unnecessarily at-
tending health facilities some ceiling on the number of
times one can seek health care within a specified time
period was also suggested. Education was also identified
as a key strategy in getting insured persons and health
providers to change from behaviors that undermine the
scheme. Generally, if people are well informed on the
concept of social health insurance such as the Ghana
NHIS and the in-built principle of cross-subsidization,
moral hazard behaviors may change. For instance, with
cross-subsidization, membership is based on ability to
pay, and the rich will pay more while the poor pay less,
thus the rich cross-subsidize the poor and vulnerable,
the healthy cross-subsidize the sick [1].
The study also revealed some moral hazard behaviors
by providers such as diagnosing simple malaria as com-
plicated malaria, over charging for drugs and services
provided to clients, charging for services not provided,
inflating number of clients provided with services and
over prescribing. NHIS officials suggested that when
they have some training on the relevant drugs for treat-
ment of some ailments it will help address the issue of
over prescribing or wrong billing.
To address some of these moral hazards from the
health care providers’ side and to reduce operational cost
of NHIS, capitation payment mechanism is being con-
templated to augment the current payment mechan-
ism which is the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG).
Initially, a fee for service type of provider payment
mechanism was used to reimburse accredited health
providers. However, this type of payment mechanism
(fee for service) was reported to be low for providers
to cover their cost of operation, especially the private
providers and it also involved a lot of paperwork as
they are required to provide detailed information on
all services and charges for claims [16, 33]. In gen-
eral, fee for service payment methods create the enab-
ling environment for providers to provide unnecessary
services to maximize profits [34]. In the light of these
and other factors, in 2008, the system was replaced
by the Ghana-Diagnostic Related Groupings (G-DRGs)
[5, 16, 21]. The G-DRGs is a tariff system that groups
diseases that are clinically similar, have comparable
treatments or operations and use similar healthcare
resources. With this system, the accredited providers
are paid an already decided all-inclusive fixed pay-
ment for patient’s treatment according to their diag-
nostic group regardless of the costs [33]. The DRG
for services also still holds some incentives for cost
escalation though they are less than the fee for ser-
vice. Because medicines at all levels continue to be
under itemized fee for service, there is strong poten-
tial for moral hazard behaviors and consequently cost
escalation [34].
Currently, the NHIS is piloting the capitation payment
system. Capitation is a provider payment mechanism in
which the health service providers such as physicians
and nurses in the payment system are paid in advance a
pre-determined fixed rate to provide a set of defined ser-
vices for each enrolled person assigned to them for a
period of time, whether or not the person seeks care
[34]. This system aims at improving cost containment,
controlling cost escalation by sharing risk between
schemes, providers and subscribers, and improving effi-
ciency in the use of resources [5, 35].
Limitations of the study
This exploratory study was conducted in only the KND,
out of the 216 districts in Ghana. Moreover, as a qualita-
tive study it is not possible to estimate how prevalent
the various behaviors and practices that undermine the
scheme are in the KND. To the extent that the study
district is not representative of all other districts in
Ghana, the generalizability of the findings may be lim-
ited. However, given that the operations of the NHIS in
the study district are not different from NHIS operations
in other districts, the results obtained in this study pro-
vides useful insights on the situation in the other dis-
tricts. Nevertheless, there is the need for further studies
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to cover more districts so as to identify moral hazard be-
haviors in other district which would inform the NHIS
and how to address these issues to improve the oper-
ation of the scheme.
The NHIS is new in Ghana and it may well be that the
behaviors identified in this study are associated with
peoples’ lack of understanding of the concept of mutual
health insurance. As people gain a better understanding
and appreciation of the scheme some of these behaviors
will disappear. Additionally, as the NHIA takes steps to
improve on the efficiency of the NHIS it will become
more difficult for clients and providers to engage in the
various practices identified in this study.
Conclusions
Ghana has taken a bold step in instituting the NHIS as
a means to ensure universal health coverage. In barely a
decade of its existence the scheme is believed to en-
hance access to health care. However, there are various
challenges undermining the efficiency of the scheme
that need to be addressed. Although the current pre-
miums are considered to be low (in relation to the cost
of medical care), community members observed that
the premiums are high and so some people are unable
to pay. In view of this, the policy within the scheme to
enhance participation of the poor and indigents need to
be applied rigorously. Also, appropriate sanctions and
punishments for various forms of abuse of the scheme
should be identified and rigorously applied. Punishing
or sanctioning people who engage in behaviors that
negatively affect the scheme will serve as a deterrent to
others and help minimize the occurrence of such be-
haviors. On the other hand, mechanisms for rewarding
individuals who regularly renew their membership for a
specified time period without consuming health care
services should be instituted.
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